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THE LEGAL CONCEPTION OF “RELIGION” 
 
Aaron R. Petty 
 
 
1. Although legal terms may be built on common concepts, it does 
not follow that they are neutral.  
2. Judges and courts generally understand religion to be primarily a 
matter of belief.  
3. The U.K. Supreme Court’s decision in JFS was flawed insofar 
as it assumed that subscription to a set of beliefs is sufficient to 
establish membership in a religion.  
4. The Supreme Court of Israel’s assumption in Rufeisen that 
determining religion by reference to beliefs is a “secular” inquiry 
ignores substantial evidence that the idea of religion itself, and 
religion-as-belief in particular, derives from early Christian 
apologetics.  
5. Over the centuries, the political hegemony of the West has 
resulted in the theological basis for understanding religion as 
primarily a set of beliefs being largely forgotten.  
6. “Religion” as a legal term of art is not neutral between religions. 
The difficulty with guarantees of religious freedom, is that just 
by employing “religion” as a category, the protection offered is 
biased.  
7. Because use of religion as a legal term calls for line-drawing, it is 
best to avoid classifying conduct based on religious factors if 
possible.  
8. The religion clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution are hopelessly in tension with each other.  
9. By equating religion with belief and conscience, the European 
Convention on Human Rights creates a system that privileges 
universalizing religions over others.  
10. The Westphalian system of nation-states is based in part on the 
idea that religion properly occupies only the private sphere in 
order to preserve public temporal authority for the state.  
 
